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Abstract: 
This chapter canvases a number of ways that issues surrounding disability 
intersect with social epistemology, particularly how dominate norms concerning 
communication and ability can epistemically disadvantage some disabled 
individuals. We begin with a discussion of how social epistemology as a field and 
debates concerning epistemic injustice in particular fail to take the problem of 
ableism seriously. In section two, we analyze the concept of an individual’s 
“knowledge capacity,” arguing that it can easily misconstrue the extended, social 
nature of both knowledge and capacity/ability. In section three, we turn to issues 
of testimony and their relation to debates concerning disability and well-being. 
We address how the regular lack of uptake of disabled people’s testimony can 
lead to a number of structural rather than merely individual epistemic injustices, 
and we also consider how the very nature of some disabilities make testimonial 
issues more complicated. In our fourth and final section, we discuss various 
norms of social interaction and how they systematically disadvantage Autistic 
people. 
 
 
Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice famously focuses on harms against a person 
“specifically in their capacity as a knower” (1). In the wake of her book, 
discussions of epistemic injustice have largely involved, if not centered upon, 
capacities or abilities. Though the literature has grown to address issues of 
epistemic injustice going far beyond the interaction of individual knowers and 
their particular abilities—ranging from the role of institutions to embedded 
cultural practices to dynamic systems and even complex technologies—the harms 
in question typically trace back to their impact on, and assumptions concerning, 
the abilities of knowers.  
 
 
* Authorship is equal.  
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While there is increasing scholarship on disability and epistemic injustice, there 
has been comparatively little reflection on the way that assumptions concerning 
the abilities of knowers are baked into the very framework of the literature on 
epistemic injustice as a whole. That is to say, whether the proximate cause of 
epistemic injustice is identity-based prejudice, unjustly distributed hermeneutic 
resources, or willful ignorance, it is assumptions about others’ abilities that 
underwrite the very concept of epistemic harm in the majority of cases. Such 
assumptions, especially when left uninvestigated, run the risk of being ableist. We 
term this the ableism problem in the literature on epistemic injustice and in social 
epistemology more generally, and our primary aim in this chapter is to describe 
and elaborate the stakes of this problem. Insofar as a given academic field 
engages in debates concerning ‘abilities,’ or its cognate term ‘capacities,’ without 
taking the problem of ableism seriously, then the door is opened to discrimination 
against people with disabilities, and the many ramifications of such 
discrimination.  
 
We proceed in four steps. In section one, we address the ableism problem in 
social epistemology, which is to say, we address how the literature on epistemic 
injustice has neglected the ways in which uncritical assumptions about ability (a) 
underwrite most forms of epistemic injustice and (b) can lead to discriminations 
against people with disabilities. In section two, we turn to critically analyze the 
concept of an individual’s “knowledge capacity,” showing how it misconstrues 
the extended, social nature of knowledge and of capacity/ability. In section three, 
we turn to the issue of epistemic injustice, testimony, and intellectual disability. In 
the closing section, we discuss the latter in terms of the relationship between 
Autistic people and communication norms. 
 
I. The Ableism Problem 
We claimed above that assumptions about others’ abilities underwrite the very 
concept of epistemic harm in the majority of cases and that such assumptions run 
the risk of being ableist. By ‘ableism,’ we use the definition by Talila “TL” 
Lewis, as developed “in conversation with Disabled Black and other negatively 
racialized folk, especially Dustin Gibson”:  
 
A system that places value on people’s bodies and minds based on 
societally constructed ideas of normalcy, intelligence, excellence and 
productivity. These constructed ideas are deeply rooted in anti-Blackness, 
eugenics, colonialism and capitalism. This form of systemic oppression 
leads to people and society determining who is valuable and worthy based 
on a person’s appearance and/or their ability to satisfactorily [re]produce, 
excel and “behave.” You do not have to be disabled to experience 
ableism.1 
 
 
1 Lewis 2020. 
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Insofar as a given academic field engages in debates concerning ‘abilities,’ or its 
cognate term ‘capacities,’ without taking the problem of ableism seriously, then 
the door is opened to discrimination against people with disabilities, and the many 
ramifications of such discrimination. Given the ways in which ableism can 
negatively impact people—and insofar as everyone, if they live long enough, will 
experience disability—there is the possibility of discrimination against any 
number of people. Furthermore, it’s possible that a person can be discriminated 
against on the basis of perceived disability.2 As a result, ableism can negatively 
affect people regardless of disability status. 
 
One reason the ableism problem persists in social epistemology is that the 
literature, on the whole, often eschews larger metaphysical or ontological 
questions concerning ability; that is to say, issues concerning not how we come to 
know or can know things, but how we are able to know things, what forms of 
embodiment are capable of knowing what, and what the concept of “ability” 
means in the first place.3 The concept of ‘ability’ or ‘capacity,’ to the contrary, is 
typically treated as an objective, if not paradigmatic property of agents. Yet, for 
decades now, scholars from the large, interdisciplinary field of disability studies 
as well as the more focused field of philosophy of disability have interrogated 
assumptions concerning human ‘capacity’ or ‘ability’ in great detail, including 
arguments that the idea of “individual capacity” is indefensible in the first place 
(Reynolds 2019; Timpe 2019). There is also comparatively little discussion of the 
relationship between the “capacities” of an epistemic agent and the affordances of 
their environment. Put more bluntly, social epistemology has yet to ask the 
question of the meaning of ability.  
 
This is further evidenced by the fact that many of the storied distinctions in the 
literature on epistemic injustice—whether concerning testimonial, hermeneutical, 
contributory, or related forms—make fundamental assumptions about 
communicative norms. They assume that the epistemic actors in the situations 
under consideration both know and are also able to comprehend and comply with 
the norms at play. Such assumptions are thrown into question, as well as the very 
concept of ‘knowledge’ in relationship to ‘ability,’ when one considers various 
forms of disability, as the discussion in section 4 will illustrate in detail. Insofar as 
the concept of ‘knowledge capacity,’ ‘individual capacity,’ and various 
communicative norms are central theoretical constructs of social epistemology 
writ large, the methods of social epistemology as well as the operative concepts in 
the field may require revision. 
 
 
2 The Americans with Disabilities Act was specifically written to provide protections from this 
option: “To be protected by the ADA, one must have a disability, which is defined by the ADA as 
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a person 
who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a person who is perceived by others as 
having such an impairment.” 
3 At the current moment, debates concerning the concept of ability or capacity play out primarily 
in the field of philosophy of action and in philosophical work relating to ecological psychology, 
both of which we discuss below. 
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Arguably, the most pressing issue here is that ableism underlies many forms of 
epistemic injustice insofar as group- and identity-based prejudices cash out in 
terms of assumptions about and specific valuations of abilities and disabilities. It 
is to this issue that we will now turn. 
 
II. A Knower’s Capacities 
Given that the field of social epistemology invariably relies upon the concept of 
capacity or ability, let us begin by discussing that concept in more detail. As 
Barbara Vetter writes: 
 
When appealing to abilities, philosophers tend to start with some everyday 
example such as the ability to play the piano or to hit the bull’s eye with 
an arrow. They then point out some general points about those abilities, 
and go on to transfer those general points onto the more difficult but 
philosophically more interesting cases that they are interested in: the 
ability to make choices for reasons or to act otherwise than one did, or the 
cognitive abilities relevant for virtue epistemology. But this direct 
projection is illicit if there is no one characterization that covers all 
abilities. We must have some independent reason for thinking that our 
preferred characterization of, say, the ability to play the piano applies to 
the cases that are of interest in the respective philosophical debate. But 
often that is precisely what is at issue.4 
 
In social epistemology writ large, the capacity or ability to know has typically 
been characterized as an ability of all the epistemic agents worth talking about. 
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First and most obviously, it leaves out 
people who do not “possess” those abilities as they are typically understood. 
Second, epistemic harms should not be limited to harms in people’s capacity as 
knowers if there are people who can be harmed epistemically but not with respect 
to their individual capacity as a knower. As we discuss in far more detail below, 
there are people whose knowledge is fundamentally symbiotic—mediated through 
a caregiver or caregivers (whether they be human or nonhuman animals) or 
through a piece of technology (and thereby through the facility, or lack thereof, of 
another using it to communicate).5 To tack harms solely to “individual capacities 
as a knower” is both to actively exclude people with disabilities whose knowing 
practices involve others in particular and also, as discussed above, to misconstrue 
the social, extended nature of knowing in general. 
 
To place a finer point on these concerns, let us turn to the famous example 
discussed by Miranda Fricker: the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee’s To Kill 
 
4 Vetter 2019, references omitted. The literature which Vetter here references largely ignores 
questions raised by or grounded in experiences of disability. Given the aims at hand, we will, on 
the whole, focus far more heavily on literatures explicitly informed by such experiences. 
55 To be clear, we consider knowledge to be fundamentally social and in that sense symbiotic—the 
question at hand is one of form and degree. 
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a Mockingbird. There is a mountain of literature interpreting this courtroom 
scene, yet there is an illuminating disability angle that is too rarely discussed. One 
reason the white jurors do not believe the testimony of Tom Robinson and one 
reason his physical disability is ignored is because he is considered 
psychologically unable to tell the truth and unable to resist certain desires. 
Miranda Fricker explains: 
 
As it turns out, the members of the jury stick with their prejudiced 
perception of the defendant, formed principally by the racial stereotypes of 
the day. Atticus Finch challenges them to dispense with these prejudicial 
stereotypes; to dispense, as he puts it, with the “assumption—the evil 
assumption—that all Negroes lie, that all Negroes are basically immoral 
beings, that all Negro men are not to be trusted around our women.” But 
when it comes to the verdict, the jurors go along with the automatic 
distrust delivered by the prejudices that structure their perception of the 
speaker. They find him guilty. And it is important that we are to interpret 
the novel so that the jurors really do find him guilty.6 
 
Fricker places a significant amount of the blame for the indefensible verdict on 
prejudicial stereotypes. But of what, more precisely, do these prejudices consist? 
It is made obvious to everyone through the course of the trial that “Tom 
Robinson’s left arm is disabled, having been injured in a machinery accident 
when he was a boy.”7 And not just any machinery accident—his arm had been 
caught in a cotton gin. With one functioning hand, how could he have carried out 
the act she claimed he did? And yet, the inability of his body to engage in the act 
of which he was charged (rape) did not matter because as a black man, he was 
considered to be both unable to tell the truth and also unable to resist the urge to 
rape a white woman.8 The psychological disabilities that were tied to him being 
racialized as Black overdetermined any other assessments of his physical 
“abilities.” This is in many ways a paradigmatic case of how prejudices such as 
racism can be rooted in ableism and how their intertwining can be determinate to 
understand the meaning of particular actions, abilities, etc., in a given case. 
 
Historian Douglas Baynton Jr. writes 
 
While disabled people can be considered one of the minority groups 
historically assigned inferior status and subjected to discrimination, 
disability has functioned for all such groups as a sign of and justification 
for inferiority…a common argument for slavery was that the impaired 
intelligence of African Americans made them incapable of equality with 
other Americans. Medical authorities explained that it is the ‘deficiency of 
cerebral matter in the cranium, and an excess of nervous matter distributed 
to the organs of sensation and assimilation, [caused] that debasement of 
 
6 Fricker 2007, 25. 
7 Fricker 2007, 23. 
8 Curry 2017 and Smith 2011. 
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mind, which has rendered the people of Africa unable to take care of 
themselves’.9 
 
And ableism did not merely ground assumptions concerning racial difference. 
Disability-negative arguments were routinely used, and typically underwrote, 
attempts to block social and political equality for women.  
 
During the debate over women’s suffrage, suffrage opponents pointed to 
women’s physical, intellectual, and psychological defects. Paralleling 
slavery arguments, they claimed both that women’ disabilities made them 
incapable of equality and that its burden would result in even greater 
disability. Their ‘great temperamental disabilities,’ the fact that ‘woman 
lacks endurance in things mental,’ that ‘she lacks nervous stability,’ meant 
that political participation would lead to ‘nervous prostration’ and 
‘hysteria.’ A prominent neurophysiologist, Charles L. Dana, estimated that 
enfranchising women would increase insanity among them.10 
 
Why is this the case—why, according to these arguments, has ableism so 
powerfully underwritten racism and sexism historically? Jackie Leach-Scully 
argues that, under the auspices of ableism, the perception of disability can lead to 
the belief in a “global epistemic incapacity” (2018). It can erase all other factors 
about a person, however palpable or relevant.11 Insofar as Tom Robinson is 
interpreted by the white jurors as “Black therefore disabled” in the sense of being 
unable to tell to the truth and unable to not be a rapist, all of the evidence 
obviously demonstrating him to be innocent falls by the wayside.  
 
In other words, the disabilities that become relevant under the light of ableism are 
refracted through other prejudices. This is one explanation for why Robinson’s 
physical disability is made moot in light of the racially inflected disabilities the 
white jurors perceive him to have—disabilities which render his knowledge not 
only untrustworthy, but effectively null. In this light, one could say that the 
ultimate, or at least a foundational, mechanism for oppression is ableism. For 
whether tied to race, ethnicity, sex, sexuality, gender, class, nation-state, 
community, tribe, or what have you, assumptions about abilities have the power 
to determine the very being of a person, including how, whether, and what they 
can know, whether that knowledge matters, and what role it can and should play 
socially. 
 
If unexamined assumptions about ability can play such a profound role, then 
literatures that use this concept without further critical reflection will invariably 
run into problems. Closer investigation concerning the concept of ability is thus 
paramount for future work in social epistemology. To help further demonstrate 
 
9 Baynton 2001b. 
10 Baynton 2001b. 
11 Cf. what Peña-Guzmán & Reynolds 2019 call ‘epistemic erasure,’ which is closely related to 
Dotson’s concepts of ‘epistemic quieting’ and ‘epistemic smothering.’ 
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this point, we will now turn to discuss the relationship between cognitive 
disability and testimony. 
III. Epistemic Injustice, Testimony, and Intellectual Disability 
While, as seen above, issues related to testimony relate to disability in general, 
they become particularly complex when the focus is not on physical disability, as 
in the Robinson case, but when one instead heeds the lived experiences of those 
who are cognitively disabled.12 In some cases involving cognitive disabilities, the 
disability itself might result in the impossibility of the kind of testimony that the 
previous section argues is important. A number of philosophers of disability have 
previously noted how certain cognitive disability can be more complex than other 
forms of disability on a number of fronts. Furthermore, Eva Kittay notes that 
“cognitive disability remains among the most stigmatized forms of disability.”13 
 
One of the reasons that cognitive disability can be especially problematic in 
academic discourse is that the power dynamics, which affect all forms and 
experiences of disability, become especially crucial. Not only in terms of 
scholarship but also in terms of the history of disability rights movements, 
cognitively disabled individuals have been exceptionally marginalized. Drawing 
on feminist epistemology, Jackie Leach Scully argues that power functions 
epistemologically in at least three ways. First, “the epistemic resources available 
to members of a society are generated and maintained within existing structures of 
power and domination.”14 Second, power is differentially distributed and leads to 
the need for what DuBois calls ‘double-consciousness’, a fixed ability to consider 
one’s self from the perspective of the oppressed and disadvantaged (in DuBois’ 
context, ‘the Negro’) and from that of the oppression (in DuBois’ context, white 
American Jim Crow culture). “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
 
12 Not everyone uses the language of cognitive vs intellectual disability in the same way. For 
instance, ‘intellectual impairment’ is the preferred locution of much of the medical and 
psychological communities, as evidenced by the definition manual of the American Association 
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), which is closely followed by the DSM. 
In the introduction to their Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, Licia 
Carlson and Eva Feder Kittay write that “we’ve chosen the term ‘cognitive disability,’ under 
which we include conditions like autism, dementia, Alzheimer’s, and [what has historically been 
called] mental retardation, rather than ‘intellectual disability.’ The former is broader. Also, some 
forms of cognitive disability do not imply diminished intellectual capacity (e.g., autism)” (Carlson 
and Kittay 2010, 1 note 1; see also Carlson 2010 and Francis 2009). Even the definition used by 
the AAIDD includes more than just strict intellectual functioning: “a disability characterized by 
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive heavier as expressed both in 
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical 
adaptive skills” (American Association on Mental Retardation 2002, 1). In what follows, we use 
the language of cognitive disability and intend our use of the term to cover the wider category of 
disability, though it should be noted that many of the sources on which we draw focus primarily 
on the more restricted class. But it should also be kept in mind that the boundaries of this class are 
both instable and permeable (Carlson 2010, 317). 
13 Kittay 2019, 95. 
14 Scully 2020, 3 in manuscript. 
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others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity.”15 Double-consciousness, for DuBois, is not just a sensation; it 
is a striving to integrate these two ways of looking at the self into a coherent hole 
while losing neither of the original views of the self.  
 
Finally, Scully argues that “the ‘generic knower’ of traditional epistemology is 
socially disembedded in a way designed to ensure its universal applicability. But 
in reality, no epistemic agent can be decontextualized to that extent, and so the 
figure of the generic knower ensures that only the aspects of the world 
experienced from a dominant position make it to any prominence in the collective 
resources.”16 As mentioned above, all three of these points have application to 
disability in general, but they’re especially significant when it comes to cognitive 
disability. Because of how individuals with cognitive disability are currently 
disenfranchised in educational and social environments, they’ll often have fewer 
such epistemic resources—and often fewer than those with other sorts of 
disabilities. Those with cognitive disabilities have a similar need to understand 
themselves ‘from the inside,’ as it were, but also from the outside perspective of a 
culture that stigmatizes, devalues, and often demeans disabled lives; but this 
striving might be made more difficult by assumptions made by able-bodied 
people about one’s impairment as well as, in some cases, by the impairment itself. 
Third, intellectual disability and other forms of neurodiversity call into question 
the supposed objective neutrality of ‘the view from nowhere’ that much of 
philosophy assumes or explicitly endorses with respect to the assumed knowledge 
capacities of an agent. 
 
These structural issues mean that cases of cognitive disability raise a number of 
issues that can be defensibly sidestepped with other kinds of disability. Here, let 
us mention two. First, cognitive disability has been taken to undermine autonomy 
to a greater degree, and perhaps in a different kind, than, say, many forms of 
physical disability. While a wheelchair-user may not be able to access a 
workplace without environmental accommodation, cognitive disability is often 
taken to rule out the kind of autonomy that most forms of labor presuppose. The 
history of disability advocacy is one in which advocacy on behalf of those with 
cognitive disabilities has had profound effects on the lives and opportunities of 
many intellectually disabled individuals. Licia Carlson argues that such advocacy 
is epistemically important to prevent supposed disengaged neutral philosophers 
from ruling out autonomy and the possibility of giving (and having others receive) 
epistemic input on one’s own life.17 But, to connect back to the earlier discussion 
of the problematic focus on ‘individual capacity’, such advocacy shows that in at 
least many cases agency, epistemic or otherwise, isn’t just a function of 
individuals but can also be fundamentally cooperative and symbiotic. Beginning 
 
15 DuBois 1997, 38. 
16 Scully 2020, 3 in manuscript. For further criticisms of the assumption that we can do philosophy 
from the detached ‘view from nowhere’ when discussing such issues, see Carlson 2010b, 
especially chapter 4; Panchuk 2019; and Barnes 2016, introduction. 
17 Carlson 2010a. 
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theoretically with an “individual” agent and their “abilities” can fundamentally 
misconstrue the nature of autonomy for individuals with certain cognitive 
disabilities. 
 
Many persons with cognitive disability are able to do significantly more 
epistemically than one might initially think, so long as we are willing to broaden 
our understanding of the relevant epistemic states. Leslie Francis, for instance, 
argues that cognitive disability is compatible with autonomy. Though her focus 
isn’t on epistemically autonomous agents, the arguments she gives are relevant for 
showing how epistemic autonomy is more degreed and complex than it is often 
taken to be.18 Often cultural and philosophical definitions of knowledge are too 
narrow, focusing, at times almost exclusively, on propositional knowledge and the 
ability to communicate it in culturally preferred ways (verbally or in writing). But 
knowledge can be found in know-how and can be accessed by others through 
practices that might be required to in the case of cognitive disability but merely 
advantageous in other cases. While the need for care is in one sense logically 
distinct from the previous concern for autonomy, the two are closely connected.  
 
Licia Carlson argues that “there is a presumption of authority on the part of the 
disengaged moral philosopher, and a corresponding dismissal of the authority of 
those who are in embodied, concrete relation to persons with intellectual 
disabilities.”19 This is true not only of philosophical discussions of intellectual 
disability, but culturally as well, and plays out in educational access, interactions 
with medical personal, and other situations. The epistemic limitations that some 
cognitive disabilities cause can be modified, at least to a significant degree, 
through a range of practices that we can label, follow Eva Kittay, as practices of 
caring.  
 
Among philosophers of disability, Kittay has done a significant amount of work 
to develop this insight. As she shows in a number of places, one can often gain 
epistemic access to another’s experience and interior world through practices of 
care. “Seeing how much care my daughter requires and the impact on her 
caregivers has led me not only to think of the obligations others have to caregivers 
but also to consider what can go wrong in the nested dependencies in which care 
is embedded…. I have come to see how easily one can draw the wrong lesson 
from the particularly of a caring experience.”20 This is why, for Kittay, we need to 
differentiate attempted care from care as a success term—that is, a normative 
sense of the word care that picks out “care as it ought to be practiced if it is to do 
what care is supposed to do” (137). Kittay uses small caps, CARE, to refer to this 
normative sense of the term. While to care can be used to describe action or 
comportment regardless of consequence and without reference to the normative 
framework in which those actions or comportments are judged, to CARE refers to 
acts or needs as understood relative to the normative framework of care ethics. 
 
18 Francis 2009. 
19 Carlson 2010, 320.  
20 Kittay 2019, 140. 
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For Kittay, then, “our relationships to others come with additional (although not 
always privileged) epistemic access to the other—and with such knowledge come 
special responsibilities to respond to that individual’s CARES.”21 
 
As the existence of Willowbrook and other similar institutions22—many of which 
were rampant with abuse in the supposed service of care, and the prevalence of 
filicide both illustrate all too well—the attempt to offer care on behalf of another 
often goes incredibly wrong. Similarly, closeness to cognitively disabled 
individuals can aid in the offering and reception of testimony and other epistemic 
goods on their behalf, also isn’t guaranteed to be efficacious. It needs to be 
admitted that closeness can sometimes be part of the problem. One example of 
this is when the care relationship leads to the substitution of the carer’s beliefs or 
agendas for those of the cared-for individual. some contexts, interpersonal 
distance might actually serve the cared-for’s needs better. Eva Kittay writes, for 
instance, that “the sense of independence disabled people hope to attain is, 
according to some, best served by a paid stranger with whom one has a thin 
relationship of employer to employee instead of the thick relationships of 
family.”23  
 
In such a case, closeness might actually increase the likelihood of overruling or 
properly interpreting the cared-for’s testimony. One involved in offering 
testimony on behalf of another who has cognitive disabilities thus needs to make 
sure that they’re not allowing their attempt at care to contribute to testimonial 
swamping or injustice: 
 
Not only negligent or abusive behavior, but even good intentions borne of the 
carer’s own needs and desires to be helpful, to do what she is sure is good for the 
cared-for even if the cared-for has good reason to reject these ministrations, can 
interfere with the care that is genuinely needed…. I have come to see how easily 
one can draw the wrong lesson from the particularity of a caring experience.24 
 
This particular issue isn’t unique to carers; there’s a similar risk involved with 
individuals with one kind of disability speaking on behalf of individuals with 
other disabilities. Susan Brison writes about “the dilemma of speaking only for 
oneself versus speaking, without warrant, on behalf of a larger group” 25 in the 
context of the trauma of sexual assault, though the dilemma applies to disability 
as well. She elaborates: 
 
The hazard of presuming to speak for all members of a group, for 
example, for all women (something white, middle-class academic 
 
21 Kittay 2019, 175. Also relevant here is Barrett Emerick’s work on empathy as a corrective to 
testimonial injustice; see Emerick 2016. 
22 See Shapiro 1994, 158ff and Solomon 2012, particularly chapters 4 and 7. 
23 Kittay 2019, 158. 
24 Kittay 2019 140. 
25 Brison 2002, 29. See also Alcoff 1991. 
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feminists have been all too prone to do), can be avoided, at least to some 
extent, by making clear the background from which one writes and 
refraining from overgeneralizing in one’s conclusion…. We need not 
speak for other survivors of trauma in order to speak with them.26 
 
Furthermore, this need to speak with, and to do so well, is of particular 
importance when thinking about social epistemology and cognitive disability.  As 
many people who critique care ethics have argued, that framework can 
inadvertently undermine self-advocacy and can too easily center the voice and 
concerns of the carer over the cared-for. That is an omnipresent threat for 
symbiotic caring relationships and the complicated nature of communication such 
relationships present. This is a further reason why getting a more nuanced 
understanding of the unique ways in which cognitively disabled individuals are 
epistemic agents is a task social epistemology needs to take up. As we understand 
it, an increased focus on collaborative knowing could take at least two forms. On 
the more restricted view, two discrete knowers would enable each other’s 
knowing through the kind of CARE we’ve been talking about in this section. Or 
one could seek to develop a more federation view in which it is a group—or 
federation—rather than individuals that know. Details of what, among other 
issues,27 a community of care looks like will depend on which approach is 
pursued, though we don’t have the space to unpack the details here.28  
 
IV. Autism and Communicative Norms 
In this final section, we briefly explore another kind of epistemic failure that is 
rooted not just in epistemic injustice but in another kind of epistemic framework, 
namely the functioning of communicative norms. Most generally, communicative 
norms are those communication patterns and practices that are assumed to be the 
default, if not the normative standard, for communication within a particular 
social domain. Communicative norms vary across cultural contexts; but even 
within a particular culture, variation in communicative practice can function to 
exclude individuals for whom those norms are either not possible or require 
significantly more effort. More specifically, communicative norms that are often 
taken for granted by non-disabled individuals systematically disadvantage certain 
disabled sub-populations. While this point can be true for a number of disabilities, 
here we focus on autism. 
 
 
26 Brison 2002, 30. Thus her advice: “Those of us writing (and using in our scholarship) first-
person narratives of group-based trauma have to be careful not to speak only for ourselves, while 
avoiding speaking, without adequate knowledge or authorization, for others” (94). 
27 For instance, Emerick’s account of empathy more closely aligns with the first of these two 
approaches. 
28 See, for instance, Piepzna-Samarasinha 2018. 
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Speaking of autism is itself complicated, given the significantly wide-range of 
experiences to which the term refers.29 It is both a contested diagnosis and an 
identity that people claim, including those who have great pride around it. In what 
follows, we will focus first on issues surrounding diagnostics. At present, an 
autism spectrum diagnosis is given on the basis of behavioral symptoms, rather 
than underlying physiological differences.30 Educational diagnoses of autism in 
the United States under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
are distinct from medical and psychological diagnoses, which use the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM, currently in its fifth edition). 
The DSM-V diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder include “persistent 
deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple contexts” 
and “restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities” that “cause 
clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 
of current functioning.”31  
 
Reflecting on the earlier DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for autism, David DeVidi 
writes that it “looks rather like it might make it a matter of definition that the goal 
of enabling meaningful reciprocal relationships for those with autism is 
quixotic.”32 DeVidi also notes that “it is unfortunate … that so many discussions 
of autism in the philosophical literature focuses on those with Asperger’s 
syndrome and others at the ‘high functioning’ end of the autism spectrum.” 33  
This runs the risk of “distort[ing] the picture of what autism involves” 34 and 
further marginalizes the input of others on the spectrum in ways continuous with 
the previous section of the present paper. And while apparent disabilities have 
their own dangers (e.g., infantilization, offensive beneficence, pity), invisible 
 
29 Cf. the work of Lydia X.Z. Brown. “Based on the work of Lorna Wing and Judith Gould in their 
1979 Camberwell study, autism was reborn as a so-called spectrum disorder. Autism was, in other 
words, reconceived of, not as a single disorder with fixed deficits, but as a conglomeration of 
several disorders and syndromes with many deficits…. Interestingly, in the most recent version of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual—the newly released DSM-5—these separate diagnostic 
labels have been collapsed under a singular designation of Autism Spectrum Disorder. Autism is 
now explicitly measured in terms of gradation of severity. Rejecting a strict categorical diagnosis 
(i.e., either one meets criteria or not) and moving toward a dimensional one (i.e., to what degree 
does one meet criteria), the DSM-5 version of autism is not so much a coherent group of 
pathological signs and symptoms but is rather understood as a spectral range of pathological 
referents anchored by oppositional poles of severity” (McGuire 2016, 50f). Jami Anderson and 
Simon Cushing go so far as to suggest that “the term ‘autistic’ might meet the fate of the outdated 
term ‘neurotic’, which turned out to be a pseudo-scientific term for an inexact clumping together 
of unrelated phenomena” (Anderson and Cushing 2012, 5; see also 10). In individual work, 
Cushing argues that “we do not have a clear conception of what autism is…. If autism is to be a 
collection of such [psychological] modules (or defects in various modules) then we either need to 
know the justification for grouping them together (the ‘bundle’ problem again) or we need a 
common explanation at the level of neurology” (Cushing 2012, 38). 
30 See Sample 2013, 76. 
31 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, 2013. Racial intersections of 
how we define disability in terms of adaptive function are discussed in Brosco 2010, 40ff. 
32 DeVidi 2013, 187. 
33 DeVidi 2012, 189; it should be noted that many autistics find language of ‘high functioning’ vs 
‘low functioning’ to be incredibly problematic. 
34 DeVidi 2012, 189. 
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disabilities (including some manifestations of autism) can be particularly 
problematic insofar as the non-disabled participant in communication may not be 
aware of the other’s disability, and they thus assume default communicative 
norms that exclude or disadvantage the other.35 This makes it easier to discount 
their testimony. 
 
The characteristic communication deficits having to do with interpreting the 
pragmatic component of the communicative content of speech”36 have significant 
interpersonal implications. “The inability to grasp significant components of what 
is being said means that often, in the normal run of conversation, a person with 
autism will not be in a position to appreciate the range of [social] options actually 
on offer.”37 Autistics can often have difficulty understanding dominant social 
cues. This leads to difficulty understanding sarcasm, for instance, or how verbal 
insults between individuals sometimes function as a sign of friendship and 
closeness rather than true insults. But the breakdown for communicative norms 
isn’t unidirectional. Forms of direct or blunt communication, often favored by 
autistics over the use of ‘social lubricants’ (e.g., indirectly saying “I’ll think about 
it” rather than the more straightforward “no”), can be interpreted by neurotypical 
individuals as rude, and questions taken to be disguised suggestions or criticisms. 
Thus, the supposed “inability” cuts both directions—it is the inability of able-
bodied people to understand and appreciate a wider set of social cues (or lack 
thereof) that is equally at play. 
 
Or consider the following characteristic of many autistics, for whom the 
preference for routine and familiarity can impede social interactions: 
 
One complicating factor [of social interaction for autistics] can (at some 
risk of oversimplification) be phrased thus: ‘No’ often doesn’t mean no. 
While this is subject to a great deal of individual variation, when a person 
with autism is asked whether or not a particular activity (going for a walk, 
stopping in at the bank, etc.) would be a good idea, especially when the 
suggestion is outside of routine, the first response can be an ‘automatic 
no’. Repeated discussion can be required before the routine-breaking 
activity can happen…. It is regarded as bad practice to accept the first 
response to such important questions…. But it takes someone who knows 
the person well to know when the fluctuation has settled into a decision.38 
 
The ability to ‘read’ Autistics sometimes requires a degree of interpersonal 
knowledge and trust that the presence of autism makes harder to establish.  
 
While the differences in various forms of Autistic communication and interaction 
cause problems, those problems look to be a function of communicative norms, 
 
35 See Stramondo 2010. 
36 DeVidi 2013, 190. 
37 DeVidi 2013, 190. 
38 DeVidi2013, 191. See also Timpe 2016, 30. 
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not a characteristic or disposition inherent in an Autistic person. If Autistics are 
not able to satisfy neurotypical communicative norms, we then have reason to 
think that autistic testimony will fail to enter into usual social exchanges. And this 
is exactly what recent research finds. In a recent study, social communication was 
examined between Autistics and between Autistic and non-Autistic partners. 
Rather than focusing on video or specifically designed interactions, Morrison et 
al. evaluated real-world unstructured interactions for participant evaluation of 
their interlocutors. The study found that “autistic participants did not share the TD 
[‘typically developing’ or neurotypical] preference for TD over autistic partners, 
and in contrast to traditional conceptualizations of autistic sociability, reported 
feeling closer to their partners than did TD adults, and disclosed more about 
themselves to autistic partners relative to TD partners.”39  
 
Furthermore, autistic participants evidenced a “greater interest in future 
interaction with other autistic adults”40 than did TD participants. Morrison et al. 
also connect their work to the DEP (double empathy problem) framework, which 
“posits a communication gap between autistic and typically developing (TD) 
people in which differences in social expression and understanding present 
barriers for cross-diagnostic interaction and connection” (2). They conclude that 
social motivation is thus a function of communicative social norms. As one of the 
researchers summarized, “these findings suggest that social interaction difficulties 
in autism are not an absolute characteristic of the individual…. Rather, social 
quality is a relational characteristic that depends on the fit between the person 
and the social environment.”41 This relational approach explains why both the 
social interactions between autistics and neurotypical individuals can be difficult 
for both participants, rather than simply an experience on the autistic side of the 
 
39 Morrison 2019, 10. Though the researchers don’t draw this connection, this finding relates to 
‘access intimacy’, which is “that elusive, hard to describe feeling when someone else ‘gets’ your 
access needs…. Access intimacy is also the intimacy I feel with many other disabled and sick 
people who have an automatic understanding of access needs out of our shared similar lived 
experience of the many different ways ableism manifests in our lives” 
(https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/access-intimacy-the-missing-link/ ). 
40 Morrison 2019, 10. 
41 https://www.utdallas.edu/news/health-medicine/autism-social-interactions-2020/ (italics added). 
These results shouldn’t be particularly surprising, as they were suggested by autistic self-advocate 
Jim Sinclair in his 1993 “Don’t Mourn for Us”: “[Autism] does not mean the child is incapable of 
relating at all. It only means you're assuming a shared system, a shared understanding of signals 
and meanings, that the child in fact does not share. It's as if you tried to have an intimate 
conversation with someone who has no comprehension of your language. Of course, the person 
won't understand what you're talking about, won't respond in the way you expect, and may well 
find the whole interaction confusing and unpleasant…. It takes more work to communicate with 
someone whose native language isn't the same as yours. And autism goes deeper than language 
and culture; autistic people are "foreigners" in any society. You're going to have to give up your 
assumptions about shared meanings. You're going to have to learn to back up to levels more basic 
than you've probably thought about before, to translate, and to check to make sure your 
translations are understood. You're going to have to give up the certainty that comes of being on 
your own familiar territory, of knowing you’re in charge 
(https://www.autreat.com/dont_mourn.html).” 
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interaction. If that’s the case, then the social difficulties can be ameliorated 
through accommodations in the social environment rather than just putting the 
entire burden on Autistics (e.g., the pressure to engage in masking behaviors). 
 
Other disabilities can impact social interactions as well. Certain physical 
disabilities make it more difficult to dress in socially approved ways (e.g., having 
one’s clothes be kempt or wearing makeup, etc.), and can also make it harder to 
get someone on time given increased transportation demands, lack of accessible 
transportation, fatigue or pain. Each of these plays directly into social norms and 
expectations regarding appearance and punctuality. Similarly, the need for 
directed/supported typing42 or the use of an augmented communication device can 
make social interaction dependent on the presence of a properly trained aid or 
functioning technology.  
 
But it is not just the content or reception of testimony that depends on social 
factors and communicative norms. Similar issues can arise not just with 
testimony, but other epistemic situations—when conferences are organized in 
ways that make participation in that conference as an epistemic contributor that 
disadvantage autistics (e.g., by not having sufficient sensory breaks that may be 
needed) or those with other disabilities (e.g., when rooms are not setup so that 
Deaf audience members see both their interpreters and the visual aids). 
Sometimes the failure to have mutually accessible norms results in injustice, as 
found, for example, in the frequency of police shootings of autistic (especially 
Black and brown male) adults.43 
 
One way that Autistics have fought back against these norms is through Autistic 
pride and by support of the larger neurodiversity movement. Though even here, 
there is concern that the movement often excludes people who cannot 
substantively engage in it.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As indicated earlier, we in no way maintain that the issues canvassed here exhaust 
the issues related reflection upon the intersection of disability and social 
epistemology. On the contrary, we hope that this piece spurs further research and 
conversation in a number of directions related to that intersection. Here, let us 
also briefly mention a number of other epistemic issues related to disability that 
we haven’t been able to explore in greater depth. We haven’t considered, for 
instance, the ways that accommodations and communicative technology can open 
 
42 On our view, directed/supported typing is distinct from facilitated communication, which we 
take to be problematic in at least some forms (see Hemsley 2018). Part of what is at stake in the 
latter qualification is that there is significant ambiguity in what the practice(s) of ‘facilitated 
communication’ refer to.   
43 See, for instance, McGuire 2016. 
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up opportunities for education.44 Or how digital technologies are changing 
interactions between those with disabilities and those without.45 Or how structural 
injustices impact finding out if one even has a disability in the first place, given 
current diagnostic practices. As with other kinds of social identities, there are also 
important issues of how the relationship of both disability and epistemology relate 
to social power.46 If one of the primary tasks of social epistemology is to 
investigate “the epistemic effects of social interactions and social systems” as a 
step toward having “well-designed social and interpersonal practices and 
institutions,” then we need to give more collective attention to disability in the 
process.47 We look forward to a deepening of work on these issues in the future.48  
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